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EXPLA N A TIO N S BY  AN A C CU SED : T R U T H  V . 
REA SO N A BLEN ESS.
The question whether a Court in a Criminal Prosecution should 
consider the truth of an explanation given by an accused, or merely 
whether the explanation is reasonable, has given rise to irreconcilable 
statements by Canadian Judges, resulting in a series of conflicting de­
cisions.
In endeavouring to trace the history of this problem in Canada, the 
case of R. v. Searle,1 may be taken as the starting point. This was a 
decision of the Alberta Appeal Court, delivered by Harvey, C.J.A. on an 
appeal from a conviction on a charge of receiving stolen goods. After 
referring to R. v. Schama, where Lord Reading, C .J. said:2
But if an explanation is given which may be true it is for the Jury to 
say on the whole of the evidence whether the accused is guilty or not; 
that is to say, if the jury think the explanation may reasonably be true, 
though they are not convinced that it is true, the prisoner is entitled  
to an acquittal . . . .
The Alberta Court concluded:
It appears from these authorities that it is the reasonableness of the 
explanation rather than the tribunal's belief in its truth that should 
guide...............
In the present case if the magistrate thought it was sufficient that he 
should disbelieve the story told he was wrong in his law.
This conclusion, it is submitted, is erroneous: it is not founded on 
sound reason or principle, but rather on a misunderstanding of the 
meaning of the words of Lord Reading. If the explanation of the 
accused is not believed then there is no explanation to consider. If on 
the other hand the Court or Jury is unable to decide whether or not to 
believe the accused, then it must direct its mind in accordance with the 
rule enunciated in the Schama case namely whether the explanation 
might reasonably be true.
The principle in the Schama case was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Richler v. R .:1 Duff, C .J.C ., citing with approval the 
words stated by Lord Reading, concluded:
T h e question, therefore, to which it was the duty of the learned trial 
Judge to apply his mind, was not whether he was convinced that the 
explanation given was the true explanation, but whether the explana­
tion might reasonably be true...............
Nowhere in the judgment was there a suggestion that if the Trial 
Judge did not believe the explanation given that he must consider 
whether it might reasonably be true. Ratner Duff, C .J.C ., affirmed the 
principle that if the trial Judge is uncertain of its truth, then he must 
direct his mind to the further question whether it might reasonably be 
true.
1. 51 C .C .C . 128
2. 11 C A R . 45
3. [1939] 4 D .L .R . 281
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Unfortunately the British Columbia Appeal Court, in R. v. Davis4, 
like the Alberta Court in R. v. Searle, did not appreciate the real prin­
ciple contained in the Schama Case, and approved in the Richler case. 
In fact Sloan, J. A., in his Judgment, shows that he did not appreciate 
the effect of the Schama case by his words “The learned Chief Justice 
then reproduces the somewhat involved language of Lord Reading in 
Schama s case”.
W hen the British Columbia Court of Appeal again considered the 
same question in the case of R. v. Nelson,5 some seven years later, it 
disregarded the situation when the Judge absolutely disbelieved the ex­
planation of an accused, and agreed with the Richler Case that in cases 
where the Judge was in doubt, the proper test was, “not whether he was 
convinced that the explanation given was true explanation, but whether 
the explanation might reasonably be true.”
The problem was again considered by the Supreme Court of Can­
ada in the case of Ungaro v. R.° This was an appeal from a conviction 
for receiving stolen goods. The trial Judge stated the explanation given 
by the accused was ‘ fantastic”, but did not state whether he disbelieved 
him. The Supreme Court ruled that he had not directed himself prop­
erly, namely, whether the explanation might reasonably be true. This 
direction, of course, as explained by Rinfret, C .J.C ., arises only in a 
case where the Judge has not decided that he disbelieves the accused. 
The learned Chief Justice stated:
I do not understand Chief Justice Duff’s statement in R ichler t >. T h e  
K ing  as meaning that if the trial judge does not believe the accused 
it is, nevertheless, his duty to apply his mind to a consideration as to 
whether the explanation given by the accused might reasonably be true.
If the trial judge does not believe the accused the result is thal no 
explanation at all is left.
However, in the judgment of Estey, J, with whom Kerwin, J (now 
C .J.C .), concurred, there is an unfortunate passage in which the words 
used seem to lead to a confusion of meaning. Estey, J, stated:7
On the assumption that he is, in the latter referring to the explan­
ation as to the source of the goods, it is clear the learned judge is direct­
ing his mind to whether the explanation is a reasonable one. He there­
fore falls into the same error that those who consider the truth, the 
reasonableness or the probability of the explanation rather than direct 
their attention to whether that explanation as made by the accused, 
having regard to all the circumstances, might reasonably be true and 
therefore set up in the mind of the judge reasonable doubt to which 
the accused is entitled to the benefit.
The passage has been urged by some Counsel to mean that the 
Judge must not determine whether ne believes the accused or not, even 
though he believes that the story of the accused is purly fictitious and 
false. It is argued that if the story might reasonably have been true, 
under the circumstances, the accused must be taken to have rebutted
4. 119411 1 D .L .R . 557
5 93 C .C.C. 344
6 11950] S .C .R . 430
7. Ib id .. p. 437
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any presumption of guilt. It is submitted, however, that this is not the 
proper meaning of the statement and that, considering the Judgment as 
a wnole, Estey, J., went no further than the conclusions of Chief Justice 
llinfret.
In 19S1 in the British Columbia case of R. v. Schlossers OTIalloran, 
J.A., and Bird, J.A., both held that the truth of an explanation was not 
the criterion. O ’IIalloran, J.A., cited R. v. Schama, Richler v. R. and 
Ungaro v. R., as authorities for the proposition and continued:
T h ai it was not enough for them to disbelieve that explanation of 
possession of the stolen bill, but that e\Cn if they did not believe it, 
yet in order to convict they must find the explanation was not a reason­
able one in the circumstances.
Bird, J.A., also purporting to follow the Richler and Ungaro cases, stated:
in my view, with great respect, an essential factor was omitted in this 
direction, in that the jury were not told that in their consideration of 
the appellant’s explanation, even though they did not believe his 
account of possession of the stolen bill, nevertheless they must deter­
mine whether that explanation might reasonably be true.
Surely such a direction is improper. If such were the state of the law, 
a jury and judge would be precluded from administering true justice. 
An accused, altnough committing perjury, would be entitled to be acquit­
ted if he were intelligent or smart enough to concoct a plausible story 
or explanation. Such cannot be the meaning of the Richler and Ungaro 
cases.
It is refreshing to refer to a decision of the English Court of Crim­
inal Appeal in the case of R. v. Aves.9 Lord Goddard, C .J., in delivering 
judgment in an appeal against a conviction for receiving, stated:
W here the only evidence is that an accused person is in possession of 
property recently stolen, a jury may infer guilty knowledge, (a) if he 
offers no explanation to account for his possession, or (b) if the jury 
are satisfied that the explanation he does offer is untrue. If, however, 
the explanation offered is one which leaves the jury in doubt whether 
he knew the property was stolen, they should be told that the case 
has not been proved.
'I’llis statement, it is submitted, concisely and correctly defines the law. 
To the same effect is a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
Kushner v. R .10 The Court not only purported to follow the principles 
laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Richler and Ungaro 
cases, but it is submitted for the first time, properly interpreted, and 
applied those principles. Pratte, J., in delivering a judgment similar in 
reasoning to that of Barclay J. and Missonette J., stated the whole sit­
uation as follows:11
If, then, an accused found in possession of goods recently stolen gives 
an explanation which the judge or the jurors are not certain is true, 
but which suffices to raise in them a reasonable doubt about his
8. 13 C .R .C . 433
9. [19501 2 A ll E .R . 330
10. 14 C .R .C . 30
11. Ib id ., p. 47.
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knowledge, that is sufficient to destroy the presumption that arises 
from the possession, and it will be necessary to seek proof of his know­
ledge elsewhere.
If the accused does not attem pt to justify his possession or if he 
gives an explanation that is found to be false, the presumption will 
continue and will be sufficient to bring about his conviction, because, 
then, it will be reasonable to presume that the accused was knowing­
ly in possession of stolen goods.
An affirmation may well appear false to one but true to a second and 
doubtful to a thirdxbut it is impossible for it to appear to an individual 
as false and doubtful at the same time; the certainty of the falsity 
excludes the possibility of the truth. Hence it follows that if the 
accused’s explanation is found to be false by the judge, there is 110 
reason why the latter should ask himself w'hether it would not be 
reasonable to believe this explanation.
The Kushner case states concisely and brings out the basic reason­
ing which was, or should have been applied, in the various judgments, 
commencing with the Schama case. If this reasoning is followed in 
other cases in which a presumption arises, requiring an explanation by 
the accused, the work of the Courts will be greatly facilitated and the 
confusion of conflicting decisions ended. For too long in this area of 
the law little caution nas been taken against the danger of abstracting 
statements found in reported decisions, without considering the case 
as a whole, and without considering the basic reasoning and principles 
behind the statement.
— Eric L. Teed,
Saint John, N. B.
